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The outbreak of the first World War marked the end of an era 
in the history of Europe; novhere vas this to be more true than 
in Russia. At the outset there vas a great shov of popular support 
for the var, much more so than for the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. 
Anti-government and revolutionary activity had soon revived folloving 
the temporary hiatus after the seemingly successful Revolution of 1905, 
but it disappeared almost entirely in the rise of national feeling and 
loyalty that accompanied the declaration of var on August 1, 1914.1 
On July 8 the Duma met to vote on var credits, vhich vere 
quickly adopted. The parties of the left refused to vote for reasons 
of principle, but they still joined in a call for national def ense.2 
Outstanding revolutionaries like the Marxist/ Plekhanov / and the 
anarchist Prince Kropotkin supported the var, fearing that a German 
victory vould mean the triumph of militarism and reaction. In 
addition, the Russian alliance with the western democracies , France and 
England, appealed to some radical and liberal intellectuals.J The only 
dissidents were emigrant social Democrat leaders such as Lenin and 
Trotsky, who advocated turning the war into a civil war. The Menshevika 
supported the war to the extent of national defense, but they emphasized 
a quick peace with no annexations or indemnities.4· The conservative 
newspaper Novoe Vremia in an article written three years later about the 
beginning of the war said, "The people closed their ranks ~rouna the 
1 R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional 
Government 1917: Documents (Stanford, California, 1961), I, 4. Hereafter 
cited as Browder and Kerensky. 
" Ibid. 
3 W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-19?1 (New York, 
1965), p. 64. Only the first volume of Chamberlin 1 s work was used as 
source material; aD. page numbers refer to thst volume. 
4 Ibid. 
around the throne. All political bickering stopped. All political parties, 
including the Social Democrats, united for the struggle against the foreign 
foe."5l~Frustrated in the far east after 1905, dominance in the Balkans and 
control of the straits had again become Russia's primary aims in foreign 
policy. The government's policy in the Balkans led Russia into.the war, and 
once the war had started, the imperial government began negotiations with) 
the other Allied governments to make sure that its long cherished goals 
would be realized{ if the war ended successfully for the Allies. In the 
spring of 1915 Russia expressed the desire to annex certain territories at 
the end of the war. These territories were Constantinople, the Bosporus 
and the Dardanelles, and certain adjacent islands and coastlines necessary 
for free usage of them and their security.6 Both France and Britain agreed 
to the satisfaction of this demand upon Russian recognition of a series of 
their claims in the Ottoman E.7ipire·'and other areas. The Treaty of London 
in 1915 was the formal acceptance of these terms. Italy also agreed after 
its entry into the war? Russia was promised Armenia, Erzerum, Trebizond, 
and northern Kurdistan by the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916,8 and at the 
Allied conference in Petrograd during January, 1917 Hussia obtainerl the 
freedom to settle the eastern boundaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
in the Briand-Pokrovskii Agreement.9 The contents of these secret treaties 
represented the war aims of the tsarist government. Obviously it would 
gain a great deal if the war were carried to a victorious copclusion by the 
Allies. 
5 Browder and Kerensky, I, 141. 
6 Ibid., II, 1054-1055. 7 Ibid. 
8 David Lloyd George, War.·l'1emoirs of David Lloyd George (Boston 1937) 
IV, 86-87. ~ ~ ~ - ' ' 
9 Browder and Kerensky, II~ 1056-1057. 
3 
The patriotic glow of the first weeks of the war soon faded in Russia. 
The demands of the var put unbearable strains on the country, and gradually 
ond polir1 call)'· 
Russia collapsed militarily, economically,;1 Military defeat and internal 
conditions broke the morale of the country and caused the revival and growth 
of pacifist and revolutionary feeling.lo As the deprivations and the sense 
of bitterness and hopelessness grew, so did the discontent. Revolution or 
drastic change seemed inevitable and to many people desirable, but no one 
11 
expected the collapse of the monarchy when it came on March l~. Although 
accompanied by riots, strikes, and meetings of the garrison in Petrograd, 
the revolution was almost bloodless. The tsarist government was not really 
destroyed, it collapsed of !ts own corruption and ineptness. 
The initial stages of the revolution were leaderless and spontaneous.l"' 
f'rom the rubble two or[anizations arose that were to share political power 
in the new Russia, the Temporary Committee of the Duma and the Soviet of 
Workers!- and Soldiers' Deputies. On March l"' the Duma created ann elected 
a Temporary Committee to restore order and to establish relations with public 
organizations and institutions; that evening it began workjto create a nev 
government for Russia.13 The Soviet revived about the same time and also 
created a Temporary Executive Committee. From the first, it was the Soviet thar 
commanded the loyalty of the majority of the population of the city, and it 
quickly began to assume some of the duties of authority.14 It was obvious 
that if the government to be set up by the Temporary Committee of the Duma 
was to have any power, it must have the support of the Soviet. 
lo 
Chamberlin, p. 64. 
1
" Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 83. 
11 
Ibid., p. 73. 
13 Ibid,, pp. 81-8..,. 
4 
The Soviet rejected the idea of taking power itself; most of its lead-
ers felt that this was the bourgeois revolution and that the socialist one 
would follow. Sukhanov, a Soviet member at the time, wrote that while avoid-
ing the responsibilities of power, the Soviet retained the right to criticize 
15 
and make demands on the government. 
On March 14 an agreement between the Temporary Committee of the Duma 
and the Executive Committee of the Soviet was reached. The Duma Committee 
accepted certain demands of the Soviet, mostly concerning civil rights and 
the calling of a constituent assembly, and the Soviet issued a declaration 
16 
of support for the Provisional Government. During the negotiations two 
men, Paul Miliukov and Alexander Kerensky, stood out, and they were to be 
the outstanding members of the Provisional Government. Miliukov had been 
the leader of the Constitutional Democrats in the Duma, and he now represent-
ed the more conservative groups in the country. He played a leading role 
in the negotiations, and Sukhanov wrote of him, "It was clear that Miliukov 
17 
here was not only a leader, but the boss of the right wing." Kerensky 
had also served in the Duma; he was a Truaovicb, a very moderate socialist. 
His views were not actually in sympathy with those of most of the Soviet mem-
hers, but he vas an emotional, stirring orator who had a way ~ith a mob and 
had been elected to the Soviet's Executive Committee. He aocepted the 
position of Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, although the 
18 
other Soviet leaders opposed participation of its members in the cabinet. 
G. M. Pal(olofUe, the French ambassador in Petrograd, recognized Kerensky's 
importance at once, "His influence with the Soviet is great. He is a man 
15 
Browder and Kerensky, I, 117-118. 
17 ~. Ibid., p. 118. 
16 
Ibid., p. 1"0. 
18 Chamberlin, p. 89. 
5 
we must try to win over to our cause. He alone is capable of making the 
Soviet realize the necessity of continuing the war and maintaining the alli-
19 ance." He correctly surmised Kerensky's views on the war, too. In one of 
the many addresses he made to mobs of soldiers in March, Kerensky told them 
~o '-° 
that triey had a double obligationy carryiflg on the war and the revolution. 
The new government/which had been formed/ was obvio1:sly going to 
have to make a decision on the question of Russia's role in the war. In 
cetennining its position on this issue, the government was under pressure 
from both internal and external bodies. The factions within Russia had di-
vergent attitudes towards the war, and they each sought to bring the govern-
ment's policy into alignmen~ with their own. The Allies also wanted the 
Russian government's stand to be sympathetic to their policies. 
Among the people and the army the desire for peace was intense. 
Kerensky believed that Russia was physically tired and spiritually revolted 
by the war and that the Russian people sought naively but honestly and sin-
?l 
cerely an escape from the hopeless situation into which Europe had blundered. 
During the first days of the revolution there were frequent rumors of 
revolution in German~ and they were widely accepted. Kerensky attributed 
these sentiments to a great popular faith " that the Russian Revolution 
would kindle the fires of fraternity in the hearts of all the working people 
of the world and that by common impulse the workman and peasants of all 
.,.., 
belligerent countries would put a stop to the patricidal war." 
19 / G. M. Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs (New York, 19"'4), III, "'34. 
?0 A. F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe (New York, 19..,7), p. 35. 
'
1 Ibid 169 _., p. • 
.,., Ib' l.Q.i.d.' p. 50. 
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There vere tvo socialist attitudes towards the war. The commencement 
of war in 1914 had caused a crisis in international socialism. The Inter-
national had traditionally adopted an anti-war, pacifist policy, denouncing 
var as capitalist and imperialist; but when the war broke out, nationalism 
proved stronger than socialism, and most European socialists remained loyal 
to their governments and cooperated in the war efforts of their countries. 
The few who refused to cooperate met at Zimmervald in Switzerland in 1915 
and Zienthal in 1916 and denounced the "capitalist~ var. Socialism was 
split into two camps, majority socialists who supported the war effort in 
their countries and minority socialists who continued to oppose it. In 
Russia the greatest number of the socialists belonged to the moderate groups, 
the Social Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks, and had initially sup-
ported the imperial government in the war. The revolution was accompanied 
by a renewal of anti-war sentiment, which became more intense because of tre 
possibility that peace might be achieved with the change in government. All 
patriotism and national feeling did not disappear overnight, however, and 
the Soviet was dominated by reoderates until the end of the summer. 
The Soviet position towards the war was not pacifist, but "defensist", 
peace 
it wanted to end the war quickly but not at the cost of a separat~with Ger-
~~ 
many. It advocated restoring the army~ continuing the war, and at the same 
ll 
time0 urged the government to drop all annexationist claims and push the 
Allies to a revision of the treaties with regard to the war aims. The Sov-
iet's position was stated in an editorial in Izvestiia, the Soviet newspaper, 
on March 31. The editorial noted that the members of the Soviet did not de-
sire conquests but liberty for all people. It said the Russians would 
continue to fight to protect their liberty until the people of the Austro-
German coalition laid down their arms.~3 It appealed to the people of 
Browder and Kerensky, II, 1080. 
7 
curope to push their governments to renunciation of conquests and adoption 
of the principle of self-determination. More importantly, it also demanded 
that the Provisional Government openly renouce policies of conquest."4 The 
theme of "fighting to protect Russian liberty" reappeared in a later Izvestiia 
i-" ,;-
editorial r Whlclr pointed out the dangers of a separate peace, German victory 
in the west and subsequent turning on Russia, and reminded the soldiers that 
they were now defending the freedom of new Russia.~5 The socialists wanted 
peace, but they had many reasons for continuing the war: to expel the enemy 
from Ru:isian territory, to prevent a German offensive to take Petrograd and 
restore tsarism, to destroy Prussian militarism, and to honestly fulfill 
?6 
the obligations to the Allie~. 
Even the Bolsheviks, the radical Russian socialists, lield a similar 
01' 
position at first. March "5~Stalin, Kamenev, and Muranov returned from 
1, 
exile and took over Pravda, the party newspaper. In the March ~s issue 
Kamenev wrote that the Bolsheviks did not want a separate peace, but the 
initiation by the Provisional Govern.~ent of steps toward negotiations to 
bring about a general pea~e. He called for obedience and devotion to duty 
~. ,.,., 
on the part of all Russians until unil~teral peace negotiations were possible. 
1.VJTll. 
The party wavered along these lines til± Lenin arrived in the middle of April 
and gave it direction. He held that war was an imperialist struggle between 
the capitalists of the world for world domination and exhorted the people 
to demand an immediate end to the war, to stop fighting the Germans, and 
.,g 
turn on the ruling classes. Lenin was hardly a pacifist, for he advocated 
"4 F. A. Golder, Documents of 
Massachusetts, 1964), p. 3"6• -
Russian History ~-1917 (Gloucester, 
"5 "ff Brovder and Kerensky~ 1.pp. 905-906 • ~6 Ibid., p. 1074. 
.,7 Chamberlin, p. 115. 
"8 lt Browder and Kerensky ~P· 904-905. 
8 
transforming the var into a class struggle, 
Refusal of military service, strike against var and 
such things are mere stupidity, ••• vork directed to the trans-
forming of the var of the peoples into civil var is the sole 
socialist work in the epoch of the imperialistic armed clash 
of the bourgeois classes of all nations ••• ?9 
In the spring and summer of 1917 this program was far too radical for many 
people in Russia, and Lenin started with little support; even most of the 
JO 
members of the Soviet thought he vas completely unrealistic. Lenin, how-
ever, knew the possibilities of a wartime situation. He represented the future, 
not the present mood of the masses, and his radical viewpoint was eventually 
Jl 
to vin for the Bolsheviks their allegiance. 
The conservative classes, the Cadets, and the right ving socialists 
wanted victory in the war above all else. On March 15 an editorial in 
Russkiia Vedomosti, a conservative newspaper, declared that Russia needed 
~~ 
above all " an executive power" wh±t:h-was aware of its responsibility to the 
~ 
country and had the ability to lead Russia to victory in the war. They 
were thoroughly committed to prosecution of the war, maintenance of the 
existing treaties with the Allies, and securing the aims recorded in those 
treaties. They considered the acquisition of the territories included in 
the treaties as necessary for the future development and safety of Russia. 
Miliukov was the spokesman of this group and while he was Foreign Minister, 
the Cadet viewpoint dominated the Provisional Government. He wanted above 
all to maintain the treaties with the Allies, but he was forced by popular 
demands to modify the language if not the intent of his statements somewhat, 
~9 Browder and Kerensky, I, 1~8. 
30 Chamberlin, p. 118. 31 Ibid., p. 119 
3? Browder and Kerensky, I, 143. 
9 
emphasizing the "liberating" nature of the Yar and the desire for peace.33 
He was reluctant to do even this because it alarmed the Allied governments 
so much. He was completely a traditionalist as far as the national problems 
and interests of Russia were concerned. 
The attitude of the Allies toward Russia after the revolution Yas ami-
biguous. Essentially they were willing to support any government that continued 
to participate in the war. They had considerable financial reasons for wanting 
to maintain a sympathetic government; England had made extensive loans to 
both the imperial and the Provisional governments, and France, the United 
34 
States, Japan, and Italy had ,Uso extended credit. Militarily Russia had 
done poorly in the Yar, but the Russian contribution should not be underrated; 
through forcing the Central Powers to maintain troop strength in the east, 
it had taken pressure off France and England on the western front. The 
American Ambassador, David Francis, recognized this and decided that it was 
very important that the Russian army continue to maintain the eastern front, 
in order to prevent the transfer of German units to the battlefields of Franc~5 
It was generally hoped in the Allied countries that the revolution was at 
least partially a protest against suspected pro-German influences at the old 
J6 
Court and that it would mean more vigorous prosecution of the var by Russia. 
The message of Lloyd George to the Premier, Prince Lvov, on March ~4 was typ-
ical of the greetings to the new [OVernment. ~~h~ It expressedl\on the part of 
Great Britain that Russia had become a democracy and confidence that thi1t-
33 Chamberlin, p. 107. 
34 Browder and Kerensky, I, 508. 
35 David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, April, 1916-
November, 1918 (Ne\l York, 19~1), pp:-1'?4-1~5. 
36 Chamberlin, p. 103. 
10 
this development vould strengthen the·determination of the Russian people 
37 
to prosecute the var until the Central Powers were defeated. 
At the same time the Allies were worried by the war weariness, the 
army 
shattered economy, the cru.mblin!Jf, and the emergence of political elements 
that demanded an end to the war or alteration of Allied and Russian war 
38 
aims. In spite of noble phrases about liberty and democracy struggling 
AlLit~ 
apainst oppression, the~~had no intention of giving up the acquisitions 
promisea to them in the treaties. All thei~ sympathy and support was ac-
companied by admonitions against changing the war aims, encouraging 
strengthening the go~ernment and the army, and going through with plans 
made for a joint Allied offensiye in spring 1917. They could not uhder-
stand the delicate balance the Provisional Government had to maintain 
between the various shades of opinion at home in order to secure support. 
Maurice Pal{ologue, the French Ambassa~or, continued to nemand that Miliukov 
issue a plain and completely unambiguous statement on Russia's intentions in 
the var, the one thing it was impossible for him to do. After reading the 
first declaration of the Provisional Government, he vent to Miliukov and 
angrily told him, 
A determination to prosecute the var at any cost and until 
full and final victory isn't even mentioned! The name of Germany 
does not occur! There isn't the slightest allusion to Prussian 
militarism: No reference whatever to our var aims!39 
Miliukov was constantly having to reassure the Allies of Russia's de-
termination not to make a separate peace or revise her var aims. Disturbed 
by the Allied attitude and actions, Kerensky felt that the Allies were un-
40 
dermining the Provisional Government. The position of Russian representatives 
at Allied councils deteriorated, important decisions vere made without consulting 
37 Lloyd George, II, 507. 
38 Brovder and Kerensky, II, 1039-1041. 
39 / Paleologue, III, ~54. 40 Kerensky, p. viii. 
11 
the Russian delegates, sharp notes were sent to the government about internal 
affairs, and supplies from the Allies fell below what was promised and some-
41 
times were defective. 
The Provisional Government officially had come into existence on March 
16. Kerensky was the only socialist member; conservative attitudes predom-
inated among the rest of the Cabinet members. Besides Miliukov as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the other members of importance were: Prince G. E. Lvov -
Premier and Minister of the Interior, A. I. Gutchkov - Minister of War and 
4"' 
Ma~ine, and M. G. Tereshchenko - Minister of Finance. On March 19, the 
government made its first declaration. On the subject of the war it promised, 
"to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victor-
43 
ious conclusion." The government also bound itself explicitly to fulfill 
'Unswervingly" the allQances that had been concluded between the tsar and tre 
Allies. Ignoring the evidence of popular anti-war sentiment, the government 
44 
expressed confidence that it was executing 1he will of the people". 
On March 17, Miliukov prepared the government's first statement on 
foreign policy. It was in the form of a note to the Russian ambassadors 
abroad to be communicated to the foreign ministers of the countries which 
they served. It declared that the new Russian government would "follow the 
democratic principles of consideration toward the small and the great nations, 
45 
of freedom of their development, ann of good understanding amo'I'€ peoples" 
but it emphasized Russia's determination to observe the agreements contracted 
46 
by the old regime and to prosecute the war to victory. The contents of 
41 Brovder and Kerensky, r+, 1040. 
4'? Kerensky, p. 109. 
43 Browder and Kerensky, I, 157. 44Ibid. 
45 I bi~., II, p. 104". 46 Ibid. 
this note suggest that it was intended to assure the Russian allies of Russia's 
continuing participation in the var. It included phrases about protection 
of the rights of small nations and the desire for peace, but these were used 
\"" ~'< ,_ 
by the western Allies too and ,hardly likely to arouse concern. A fev days 
later Mi.liukov requested and quickly received from the Allies confirmations 
47 
of the agreements made by the imperial government. Obviously the revolu-
tionary government had not abandoned the var aims of the tsarist regime. 
The Soviet, however, reflecting the anti-war wishes of most of the people, 
found Miliukov's statements unsatisfactory. Although the exact terms of tm 
treaties made by the imperial government were still secret, the intentions 
toward Constantinople, the straits, and the Balkans were well known, and the 
48 
Soviet began to press the government to renounce all annexationist views. 
All the members of the Provisional Government felt that Russia should con-
tinue the war to a decisive victory in collaboration with the Allies for the 
sake of national interests, but after learning of the terms of the secret 
treaties, they recognized the need for altering at least the phraseology of 
Russia's var aims to reflect the opinions generally held by the public and 
49 
supported by the majority of the Soviet. Miliukov vas the only Minister 
completely opposed. Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and Lvov favored the issuing 
of a declaration as demanded by the Soviet, and they persuaded their colleagues. 
Reluctantly Miliukov drafted a document vith the aid of his associates; it 
vas a compromise between Miliukov's views and the wording requested by the 
Soviet, and it was published as a domestic statement, not a diplomatic note. 
The declaration was released on April 9, and al though it mentioned that the 
gove~runent intended to observe the obligations to the Allies and def end the 
country's rights, it firmly asserted that the government's aim was ~not 
47 Browder and Kerensky, II, 104~. 
48 lbig.,p. 101+5. 49 Ibid., p. 1039. 
13 
domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or 
forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of a stable 
50 
peace on the basis of the self-determihation of peoples." It defined the 
army's task as being the nefense of Russia and the freeing of Russian terri-
51 
tory held by the enemy. 
About the same time Kerensky in an interview given a British journalist, 
advocated the internationalization of the straits and Constantinople. When 
the interview vas published in Britain, it caused an uneasy reaction in the 
I'/ 
British government. On AprilAMiliukov sent a note to the Russian embassies 
in Rome, Paris, and London refuting Kerensky's statement and reassuring the 
Allies that Russia would not renounce the treaties because they obtained cer-
tain "vital interests" for the country. The note also stated that the Russian 
5? 
public and army firmly supported the 'government's position. 
These words may have been soothing to the Allies, but they were not 
truthful. In reality, the views of the population vere much closer to those 
of the Soviet. It was natural that the Soviet's ains should be so close to 
those of the population, since it was composed of directly elected repre-
sentatives of the people. Soon after the revolution the Soviet issued an 
"Appeal to the Peoples of all the World." Announcing the fact of revolution 
in Russia, the Appeal called for all people to commence a struggle against 
53 
~the acquisitive ambitions of all countries" and make the question of var 
or peace their decision. Through this·, it proposed, international unity 
could be restored and the liberation of man achieved, the aims to which the 
Russian people were pledged. The Appeal affirmed the determination of the 
Russian democracy to oppose the policy of conquest and to achieve peace. It 
included the Soviet's reason for continuing to support the war effort, pro-
50 Browder and Kerensky, II, 1046. 5l Ibid. 
5~ Ibid., 1057-1058. 53 ~-, p. 1077. 
14 
tection of the achievements of the revolution. 54 
The government, however, ignored the popular demand for a change in 
war aims expressed in the Soviet's pronouncements. To the Allied ambassadors 
it especially emphasized its decision not to alter the war policy. Sir George 
Buchanan, the British ambassador, obtained unofficial reassurances from 
Miliukov that the Provisional Government was determined to restore discipline 
55 
in the anny and continue the war before he would recognize the government. 
Miliukov made the same statement to Paleologue, but the French ambassador 
couldn't accept the discrepancy between the public and private or diplomatic 
pronouncements of the governrr.ent. He continued to insist on certainty in the 
government's statements. Miliukov explained the difficulty of working with 
56 
the Socialists and the necessity of keeping their support. When Pal(ologue 
became angry over the Provisional Government's first declaration, Miliukov 
attempted to point out the need for duplicity, "he argued that the manifesto 
57 
was intended specifically for the Russian nation." Francis also interview-
ed Miliukov on the 18th of March, but was satisfied with information he received 
and recorded in his journal, "Rodzianko and Miliukov both assure me that the 
58 
Provisional Goverru.~ent will vigorously prosecute the war." 
The Allied ambassadors, despite constant reasurances, recognized that 
the Soviet had all real power. On Pal(ologue 1 s suggestion, Britain and France 
sent socialist delegations from their countries to Russia to persuade the 
59 
Soviet to adopt a pro-war stand. The Allied Socialists arrived in April. 
They were cooly received in the Soviet and attempted to make conciliatory 
statements which upset Pal{ologue and Miliukov very much. Miliukov ana 
Kerensky both warmly greeted the delegates on behalf of the govern.~ent on 
54 Bro"Wder and Kerensky, II, 1077-1078. 55 Ibid _., p. 1043. 
56 / 57 Ibid., Paleologue, III, "48. p. "55. 
58 59 / Francis, pp. 90-90. Paleologue, III, ,.,54. 
15 
April 18, but their two speeches indicate the differences of opinion in the 
Cabinet at the time. Hiliukov spoke first, emphasizing that the ne-w Russia 60 
was more determined than ever to prosecute the war and end German militarism. 
Afte~ards Kerensky made an ad~ress, but of a different tone. He announced 
that the Russian de~ocracy had renounced all ap~ression and imperialism and 
urged the French and English peoples to force their ''bourgeois classes" to 
61 
do the same thing. 
Paltalogue w~s very pessimistic about the situation in Russia when he 
was recalled in May. He was sure that the national effort would weaken and 
6., 
that France's aims in eastern Europe would have to be altered. He didn't doubt 
Miluikov's willingness to continue the var, but felt the new forces must be 
taken into account. He didn't believe even the Soviet could control the mob 
63 
and feared Russia would make separate peace with Germany. Francis, in con-
trast, remained very enthusiastic about the revolution. He was just as eager 
as Pal~logue for Russia to ren:ain in the var, but was delighted at the 
government's emphasis on the war being dedicated to fre€dom, democracy, and 
I 
t_ I_ • peace. t,ov,._, · 
The American entry into the war heightened Francie' ebullience. Miliukov, 
however, was worried by Presinent Wilson's statements on Allied war aims, 
particularly the phrase "peace without annexations." On May 3 he issued a 
declaration on Russia's var aims apropos of American participation in the 
war. Miliukov expressed the idea that the Allied task in the war vas the 
reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires with the libera-
tion of the nationalities oppressed by them. He included among the particular 
goals of the Allies "creation of an independent Czechoslovakian state ••• the 
60 
Browder and Kerensky, II, 1051. 61 Ibid. 
6., / 
Paleologue, III, "98. 6J Ibirl., p. "45. 
16 
return of Italians to Italy, of Pumnnians to Rumania, the natural unifies-
tion of the Serbian people, and also the union of the Ukrainian population 
64 
of the Austrian regions vith the population of our ovn Ukrainian regions ••• " 
He firmly and explicitly asserted that the straits must come into Russian 
possession and that neutralization of them vas less acceptable than Turkish 
control. I7deference to the American President, he stated that these goals 
vere in accordance vith Wilson's principles ana could not be consiaered as 
65 
annexations. This statement vas a bombshell in the Cabinet, vhich split 
into tvo camps, those vho supported Miliukov and those vho supported Kerensky, 
vho came out in favor of neutralization of the Dardanelles and no annexations. 
Francis believed the majority of the Cabinet shared Kerensky's viev. An up-
roar vas also raised in the Soviet over the statement; Miliukov had failed 
66 
to consult the Soviet before releasing it. 
This incident added to the graving tension between the Provisional 
Government and the Soviet, which continued to demand a revision of the 
government's var sins. Miliukov remained unwilling to alter drastically 
even the phraseology of the government's statements in deference to the 
67 
Soviet, for fear of alienating the Allies. In a conversation with Am-
/ bassador Paleologue he said, "if the Soviet got its vay (on var aims) I 
68 
should resign my office at once!" 
Kerensky represented the view of the Soviet in the discussions vith 
Miliuko~ and gradually he von the support of most of the rest of the Cabinet. 
The struggle came to a head vhen Kerensky and the Soviet forced Miliukov to 
64 Browder and Kerensky, II, 1044-45. 65Ibid 
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send a copy of the April 9 declaration--of the government to the Allies. 
Miliukov insisted that the declaration vas a compromise between the opinions 
69 
in Russia and couldn't be sent to the Allies without an explanation. The 
government accepted this position, and the accompanying explanatory note was 
70 
edited by the entire Cabinet and published on May 1. The note said, 
Imbued with this new spirit of liberated democracy, the 
pronouncements of the Provisional Government naturally cannot 
give any reason to think that the revolution which has taken 
place will lead to the weakening of Rus~ia's role in the com-
mon struggle of the Allies ••• It goes without saying, as stated 
in the attached document, that the Provisional Government, 
while defending the rights of our motherland, vill ~ully observe 
the obligations taken with respect to our Allies ••• 1 . 
The reaction in the streets and in the Soviet began imrnediat~ly. ·It 
vas not so much that the content was offensive as that Miliukov's name had 
7., 
become a symbol of imperialism. Street demonstrations on May 3 and 4 de-
manded Miliukov's resignation. On May 5 the government issued another 
explanatory note with a tone more conciliatory to the public; it was accepted 
by the Soviet. The government had already decided , nevertheless, that 
Hiliukov must be shifted to a less dangerous place in the Cabinet and that 
73 
some of the Soviet leaders should be included in the government. The 
conservative groups hoped that this would assure more support for the 
74 
government and gain backing for a planned offensive. Miliuko·1 refused to 
accept the position of Minister of E.ducation and resigned on May 8; Gutchkov 
also resigned because of discouragrnent with the continued disintegration of 
75 
the army. 
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During the period of the crisis Kerensky had been attempting to persuade 
the Soviet to join in a coalition government; after negotiations over terms 
it accepted. It joined on the conait.i.on that the government direct its 
foreign policy towards securing a peace based on self-determination of people~ 
1 ~j~.:.•••',., rf 
,ne annexations or indemnities, and preparations for negotiations with the 
76 
Allies on revising the treaties. The Soviet agreed to support an offensive 
at the front, having recognized that its appeals were not activating much 
response abroad and hoping that there vould be more reaction if Russia were 
77 
in a strong position militarily. In the new Cabinet, Kerensky became 
Minister of War; five other Socialists were included; and the rest of the 
posts were filled with conservatives and non-socialist moderates, including 
Tereshchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prince Lvov remained. as Premie~ 
but from the start Kerensky dominated, and together with Tereshchenko and 
Nekrasov ran the government. 
The issue of var aims had caused the change in government, and the pol-
icy of the coalition was determined by a desire to avoid any conflict with 
the Soviet on this subject. The government took no firm or concrete steps 
to repudiate the war aims of the imperial or the previous revolutionary 
governments, but it adopten a policy of conciliation vith the Soviet as far 
as possible. The Cabinet was completely willing to adjust its public and 
diplomatic language and methods so as not to alienate the Soviet and the 
people. It maintained this new stand towards the Allies as well as the 
Russian public, perhaps feeling secure that the Allies would never consent 
to a revision of the existing treaties even if the Russian government of-
ficially asked for a conference to consider this. The government's true 
position can only be judged by its deeds; it never renounced or even made 
76 Chamberlin, p. 147. 77 
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put:lic the secret treaties with the Allies. The war aims had not significant-
ly changed from those represented by the treaties, although the government's 
public pronouncements concealed this. On May 18, the day after it was 
organized , the coalition government issued a declaration of its program. 
It adopted as its aim in foreign policy the establishment of a general peace 
without annexations or indemnities ann based on the right of self-determina-
tion. In answer to the demands of the Soviet, the government promised to 
take measures towards a revision of the inter-allies agreements. The 
decleration also stated that the government was convinced that an Allied 
defeat would make the conclusion of a just peace impossible and that therefore 
?8 
the Russian army would continue to fight. This idea and the idea of 
national defense were the reasons used by the Provisional Government to justify 
its participation in the war and to create public support for this participation. 
Tereshchenko, the Foreign Minister, was a wealthy young manufacturer_,!-' 
vho belonged to no political party. He proved to be fairly agile in main-
taining a balance between not seriously offending the Allied governments ann 
keeping on good terms with the Soviet. On May 19 he issued a communique to 
the press discussing his program. Russia wanted to establish peace as soon 
as possible, he noted, but it could not break its ties with the Allies 
without betraying its honor. Peace must be vithout annexations or indemnities 
and based on the right of self-determination; it must be an international 
peace. The new Foreign Minister coDllllitted the government to take steps to 
arrange a conference with the Allies concerning ways to secure peace. He 
maintained that the Allies could hardly be considered as annexationists at 
a tin:e when P..ussia, Belgium, France, and Serbia were occupied by the Germans. 
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Tereshchenko also observed that the Russian army must be prepared to continue 
fighting and even take the offensive if Russia were to be in the position of 
79 
strength necessary for achieving its aims. 
Kerensky's task as Minister of War was to restore the fightine capacity 
80 
of the army. The government harl definitely decided on an offensive for the 
early summer. The conservatives hoped the offensive would bring a successful 
end to the war and terminate the upheaval at home, and the moderate socialists 
thought it would raise Russia's prestige and force the Allies and Germany to 
81 
take its peace program more seriously. Kerensky was acceptable to both 
croups. Izvestiia wrote on his appointment, "From now on, the Ministry of 
war will be headed by a minister who is a revolutionary to whom the ~r~y can 
8? 
blindly and without reservations entrust its fate." Kerensky began a 
round of visits to anny units; his program was to make appeals to the soldiers 
an~ to take certain a~ministrative measures to make use of the democratic 
institutions in the army. "Forward to the battle for freedom!" was his slo-
8.3 
ran. The offensive began on July 1, and was initially successful; once 
faced with strong German units, ho~ever, it collapsed completely. By July 
84 
24 the whole episode was over, and the state of the army was wors~ than ever. 
The hopes that an offensive at the front would lead the country out of the 
crisis were destroyed. 
On July 15, four Cadet Ministers resigned from the Cabinet in protest 
against the failure of the Socialist ministers to restore the army or control 
85 
the workers. Soldiers anc workers began demonstrations calling for the 
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Soviet to assu::1e all power. The demonstrations grew and there were suspicions 
of a Bolshevist coup, but the Bolshevik leaders did not feel that the time 
was ripe to seize control. The unrest reached a peak an July 17, and the 
powerless government could do nothing to restore order in Petrograd. The 
Soviet too was unable to control the mob. The Provisional Government ann 
the Soviet were in a helpless position until the demonstrators, lacking a 
86 
definite goal, were rliscouraged by the arrival of loyal troops. 
After struggling for several days and at one point even resigning temp-
orarily, Kerensky was able to create a new coalition government with himself 
ns Prime Minister on August 6. Supposedly the members renounced all party 
ties in order to be completely free to take the steps necessary to save the 
country; actually there were more socialist members than non-socialists, but 
87 
they were generally right-wing socialists. Thia change in the Provisional 
Government resulted in no changes in foreign policy or war aims. The Soviet 
88 
continued to give the government and its policies resolute support. The 
Allies, seriously frightened by the ominous developments, became more anx-
ious and demanding, and Tereshchenko sent another reassuring dispatch to 
89 
them. 
The July Days, however, had other results that were far reaching. In 
reaction the government and the conservative classes pushed further right, 
and suppression of the Bolsheviks and other radical leftists began. The 
mood of the people became more radical, and they were more insistent on the 
acccmplishment of their demands. The Provisional Government harl failed to 
solve the basic problems confronting the country; both the conservative ele-
ments in the population and the masses-of workers and soldiers began to 
look elsevhere. 
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The conservative reaction centered in the Kornilov conspiracy to take 
over the government from the right. The plot led by General Kornilov failed 
tlle 
to oust the Provisional Government, but it was111mmediate impetus for its down-90 
fall. The discontented masses were aroused to revolutionary action, and the 
distrust created between the socialists groups and the conservative ones re-
sulte<l in the gradual failing of moderation even in the Soviet. On September 
91 
13 it adopted a Bolshevik resolution. The government again turned to the 
right for support, which alienated it even more from the people. Its goals 
were meaningless for most Russians. It refused to publicly alter its basic 
position in foreign affairs, and put forward no real answers to the popular 
~ernands for "bread" and "land" either. 
cov.p 
The rapid decline after the Kornilovl\came at a time when Kerensky 
e.,.u llv.JGr ~elieved he had hopes of b6ing aoJ.~ te oRd some of the internal pressure on 
the governrr.entj'through achieving peace on the southwestern front. Motiva-
ted by the increasingly radical atmos~here in Russia, Kerensky had reconsid-
ered the techniques if not the basic goals of his foreign policy. Although 
the government would not consider a separAte peace with Germany, and had 
ignored several Gennan offers because of a sincere fear of German intentions, 
it vas seriously considering an offer from Austria-Hungary. Without Berlin's 
knowledge the government of Austria-Hungary had requested the Provisional 
9'> 
Govern~ent for a separate peace. Tereshchenko had been preparing a plan 
for negotiations with Bulgaria and Turkey to bring about their exit from the 
war. With Austria corrmencing the move, Kerensky felt certain that Bulgaria 
and Turkey would soon follow its example. He hoped to arrange a peace in 
93 
the southwest an~ secure some type of Russian control over the straits. 
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This arrangement was being made without the knowledge of the Allies. Typically 
for ~iplomatic maneuvres, it was proeressing very slowly; too slowly to be an 
advantage for the Provisional Government. 
During the late swmner and fall the Provisional Government was also 
making plans for an Allied conference to be held in Paris. The Soviet had 
demanded such a conference since spring; it wanted a discussion of the Allied 
treaties and agreements with revision of the var aims as a goal. In Izvestiia 
as early as April 15, Tseretelli, a Soviet leader, said, ~we are declaring 
that the Russian democracy considers it necessary for the Provisional Govern-
ment to enter into negotiations with the Allied powers for the purpose of 
94 
vorking out a general agreement on this platform (no annexations)·•'.•'! This 
demand vas repeated in ,µ.most every pronouncement the Soviet ma.de. Finally 
in June, Tereshchenko prepared a note proposing an Allied conference and sent 
it with Thomas, the French Socialist, when he left Russia. On June 16 the 
note was published in Russia. Pledging loyalty to the Allied cause, it 
proposed the convening, as soon as the situation became favorable, of an 
Allied conference to revise the agreements on the subject of the basic aims 
of the var. The only agreEment that was not to be considered was the one 
95 
vbich obligated each country not to conclude a separate peace. No invita-
tions were sent through official diplomatic channels at that time, however. 
96 
The move was heartily endorsed by the Socialist organizations and press. 
In July Bakhmet'ev, the Russian ambassa0or in Washington, recommended 
to Tereshchenka that the United States be invited to the proposed conference, 
because America was giving oirect support to the democratic direction in 
Russian foreign policy and would ·probably support Russia at the conference. 
94 Browder ann Kerensky, Il, 108?. 
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On July ,,g Tereshchenko cabled a reply to Bakhmet'ev agreeing with him on 
the wisdom of securing of American support, but informing him that the pro-
posed conference must be postponed in view of the failure of the offensive 
and the July Days; tie emphasized that all efforts were to be concentrated 
97 
on the continuation of the war. 
After several further postponements the conference was definitely 
scheduled for Paris on Noveraber 16. The Russian delegates were to be 
Tereshchenko, General Alekseev, and one representative to be elected by 
98 
the revolutionary democracy. Kerensky issued an appeal on October "4 which 
stated the government's policy on the conference. He said that the Russian 
representatives at the conferen~e would work to reach "the solution of common 
99 
questions an0 military problems" and an arreement with the Allies based on 
the principles of the new Russia. At the same time, he concluded, the 
government would continue its war efforts for the country and the "common, 
100 
Allierl cause." 
The Executive ~mmittee of the Soviet drew up instructions for the 
Soviet's delegate. They wanted an aereement to be concluded on war aims 
based on the principles of no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination. 
The instructions also included several specific suggestions on territorial 
matters, such as neut!·alization of the straits, and it had guarantees to pre-
vent future wars, such as abolition of secret treaties, elimination of 
economic blockades, and gradual disarmament. It endorsed the creation of 
a League of Nations, if all states were to be on equal footing, and it 
proposed Allied negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary as soon as they 
101 
renounced seizure by force. 
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The Soviet's instructions cau~ed great confusion and discontent in the 
Allied countries, and tr1ere vas even the possibility of excluding Russia from 
the conference. Tereshchenko condemned the Soviet for this presumption of 
10? 
authority. The newspaper Rech' expressed the conservative attitude toward 
the conference, "this formula· (no annexations or indemnities) obviously does 
r.ot take into account the vital interest of the Russian people and no support 
103 
c~ be found in it for defending the dignity of Russia as a great power." 
These debates were futile, ho'Wever, because as Kerensky hinted, the Allied 
governments had already decided to limit the discussion to definite military 
plans. Then the Bolshevik revolution toppled the Provisional Government be-
fore the date of the conference. Russia did not participate in it. 
One of the aims of ~he Soviet's instructions to its delegate to the 
Allied Conference was for the Allied nations to remove all barriers to the 
104 
Stockholm Conference. This conference had also Peen'a goal of the Soviet 
since at least early summer. In the spring of 1917 Dutch and Scandinavian 
socialists, inspired by the revolution and the Soviet, began efforts to call 
an international socialist conference. A representative was sent to Russia 
to secure the cooperation of the Soviet. In spite of the opposition of the 
Bolsheviks, the Executive Committee of the Soviet approved a resolution to 
call a conference. The Russian-Dutch-Scandinavian Committee issued an invi-
tation to a conference of minority and majority socialists to be held in 
Stockholm beginning August "· The purpose of the conference was to consider 
the world war, the International, the peace program of the International,-
and ~ethods for realizing this program and bringing the war to an end soon~05 
The Soviet also called for a conference. On May 15 the Soviet made an appeal 
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to the socialists of the world urging support for the conference. The appeal 
jl ~llC t' 
said that the"Russian Revolutionary Democracy" did not want a separat9f which 
would leave Gennany and Austria free to deal with~he western Allies and "would 
·r 106 
be a betrayal of the cause of the worker's democracy of all countries." 
It called upon the Allied socialists to force their rovernments to abandon 
plans for annexations and concluded with an appeal to Austro-German social-
107 
ists to bring an end to the war in order to save the revolution. 
The idea of a conference was favorably received by many socialists, 
but the Allied governments were hostile. On May ~1 the United States refused 
to issue passports to delegates. In June, Frande and Italy followed suit, 
and on August 13 Great Britain did likewise. In announcing this, Lloyd George 
read a letter from Tereshchenko in which the Foreign Minister wrote that al-
though the government couldn't prevent Russian delegates from going, it re-
garded the conference as a party affair, not binding on the government. 
Lloyd George also said that he had received information that Kerensky opposed 
the conference. Both Kerensky and Tereshchenko made denials of these 
108 
statements. Lloyd George was aware of their reasons for doing this and 
commented, "This last point was the really difficult aspect of the problem. 
M. Kerensky was still struggling with the power of the Soviet, and to some 
extent dependent on its good will. He dare not announce his open opposition 
109 
to it ••• n After the British incident the Provisional GoverIDrient made a 
statement on the Stockholm Conference on August 15. It announced that the 
government considered the solution to th~ problems concerning war and peace 
as exclusively the responsibility of the Russian and Allied governments. The 
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statement repeated. that the Stockholm Conference vas a meeting of specific 
political parties and could not make decisions binding on the governments. 
Denying that the Provisional Government intended to refuse passports to 
Russian socialists planning to attend the Conference, it said that both the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had advised the Allied 
110 
governments not to -,obstruct the convention of the Gonf erence. This 
protestation did not move the Allied governments to reverse their decisions; 
111 
consequently the Stockholm Gonf erence never took place. 
While the demand for peace vas growing more urgent, the Provisional 
Government remained inflexible on the subject of war al~. ln~late October 
when the Council of the Republic met, the government again affinned the same 
basic goals. Only two weeks before the Bolshevik coup, Tereshchenko told 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council that the minimum conditions for 
the conclusion of a peace vere access to the Baltic Sea, access to the south-
11~ 
ern seas, and assurance of economic independence. These aims precluded 
hostile foreign control of the straits and self-determination in Poland, 
llJ 
Lithuania, or Latvia. This speech was made to a private session of the 
committee. Public and diplomatic pronouncements were still made in a different 
tone, obviously used to appease the popular claI:lOr. According to Kerensky, 
"the language of her diplomacy and her diplomatic methods ••• did not, of course, 
~ll4 
in any way prejudice Russia's actions after victory. 
It was ironic that even late in October the Provisional Government vas 
not attempting to satisfy the demands-of the Russian masses. The mutiny of 
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the army, the peasant seizures of iand, and the growing radicalism of the 
workers' demands continued. There was no room for compromise. Public 
sentiment had gone beyon~ the moderate views of the Soviet. The passionate 
desire for the end of the war was a major factor in the growth Bolshevist 
influence among the people. Patriotism as far as the war was concerned had 
ended in Russia by fall 1917. The one desire was for peace. By failing to 
answer this demand, the Provisional Government brought about its own down-
fall. November 7 all of Lenin's work capitalizing on the popular anti-war 
sentiment came to fruition; the Provisional Government fell with almost no 
115 
struggle. Kerensky fled Russia on the 14th. With the success of the 
Bolsheviks the question of war aims became a dead issue. Bound by the 
desires that brought them to power, the Bolsheviks' solution to the problem 
was predetermined. They had agitated for an end to the war, and they 
realized this goal, at first by ceasing all fighting and then officially in 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
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